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This. paper presents an analysis ofpatterns of access to education in five Eastern
European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia) between
1940 and 1985. As in other industrial countries, average educational attainment
(measured by duration, i.e. years in school) has increased greatly since 1940. But the
rise was most rapid expansion until 1970. In all five countries, women increased their
educational attainment more than men, By 1975, the difference between men and
women in regard to years of schooling had virtually disappeared in all countries
studied Parents' educational attainment (measured as average years ofschooling of
father and mother) proves to be a main determinant of their children's attainment.
However, the effect ofparents' education decreased by about halfform 1940 to 1985.
ellltura/resources (measured by parents' cultural behavior while the respondent was
growing up) tlIrns out to be a strongpredictor ofeducational attainment, and equally
soJar men and women. It accountsJor about one-third ojthe educational reproduction
effect. However, the effect aJcultural 'background declined considerably under
communism. Finally, parents' political resources (measured as parents membership
oj the Communist Party) shows to have a weak but consistent effect on educational
attainment in the five countries. Although this effect was relatively strong in the early
communist period, it was negligible Jor the younger cohorts.
1. INTRODUCTION
\ .
The demise of state socialism in Eastern Europe in 1989 marks the\end of what can be
regarded as one of the largest-scale destratification experiments irt the history of the human
race. In this experiment, one of the explicit aims of the former communist regimes was to
reverse the majorfonns of social stratification and forcefully imPt?se aq equalized distribution,
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of societal rewards. To this end, the communist regimes abolished private ownership of means
of production and prevented the accumulation of material and financial capital in private
hands. The government instituted negative discrimination of traditionally privileged social
groups (bourgeois), positive discrimination of traditionally underprivileged social groups (in
particular manual workers), and strict control ofmigration, both within and between countries.
In addition to directly influencing the distribution of scarce goods in society, marxist policyw
makers • unlike marxist sociologists (Wright 1985) - have taken into account that the
allocation of scarce goods does not stop at the distribution of goods within a single generation.
It also involves the transmission of goods between consecutive generations, Marxist policyw
makers have shown an astute awareness of the fact that the family is the basic unit of social
stratification. Accordingly, they knew that the transmission ofsocietal(dis)advantages between
generations, e.g. from parents to their children, plays a major role in shaping the distribution
of goods and opportunities. For that reason, socialist policywmakers placed the task of
influencing patterns of social mobility and social reproduction high on their agenda.
Specifically, influencing the intergenerational transfer of resources within families was a main
target of their destratification policies. The abolition of large-scale private ownership and the
right to inherit several forms of private goods are telling examples. '
The efforts to reduce social reproduction ,went beyond policies o'n the transfer of private
property and other material resources. Policies were also introduced to influence educational
selection processes. It was well understood that in modern societies, education serves as an
important means of transferring social inequality between generations. State socialist countries
therefore actively increased the educational opportunities for children ofpeople in lower social
positions and decreased these opportunities for children of people in high positions. At some
point; all communist countries took measures to enhance the educational opportunities of the'
offspring of manual and farm workers and to actively discriminate against the educational
advancement of others, in particular the children of (formerly) bourgeois classes. The policies
adopted went far beyond the usual practices of stimulation and "head start'" programs commOn
in Western societies since the 1960s. In particular, active individual discrimination was used
to select students for admission to secondary and tertiary education (or keep them out). It
would seem that these policies have to a large extent shaped the educational destinies of the
populations of Eastern· Europe, \
The first aim of this study is to assess the level of intergenerational educational reproduction
in five Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia)
during the communist era. We therefore examine the extent to which the educational
attainment of children is related to their parents' education. A second aim of this paper is to
assess the extent to which cultural characteristics and the political status of parents mediate
this relation, giving attention to 'the developments over time in the effects of these
characteristics. This paper improves on earlier work by investigating data from a largewscale
survey containing information on relevant characteristics of respondents and their parents in
un internationally comparable format.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EARLIER RESEARCH
It is generally assumed that a person's social background has a substantial influence on his
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or her educational career. In all industrialized countries, children from the lower social classes
are less successful in their educational career than children from the higher classes (Shavit and
Blossfeld, 1993). From their start, Marxist regimes have tried to create a more egualitarian
society. Being aware of the processes of educational reproduction, they have sought to
minimize the strength of the relation between education and social background. To do this,
several measures have been applied in all communist countries. Especially in the 19505, strict
quotas were imposed. For instance; placement in schools and universities was reserved for
children of farmers and manual workers. In fact, coming from a bourgeoisbackground could
be a reason not to be admitted to higher education. It could therefore be expected that such
rigorous measures would have a strong impact on the distribution of educational opportunities.
In the same vein, a trend towards a more open society could be foreseen. Furthermore, the
chances for children from diverse social backgrounds to obtain an educational degree may be
expected to become very similar. We might even expect that the chances for children from
the lower social classes to get a (high) educational degree would become better than for
children from the higher classes.
However, previous analyses hardly suggest that the destratification experiment has
accomplished its goals in all respects, and certainly not with respect to educational opportunity
(Peschar 1990, 1993). Findings on importantdimensions of stratification) such as consumption
patterns and occupational mobility, hardly suggest destratification across the board, as was
observed some time ago (Lane 1971, 1982j Connor 1979). Inequality in access to (higher)
education continues to resemble the structure of educational opportunity in other industrial
societies: the social status of parents determines. the educational chances of their offspring
quite strongly. There seems to have been not much change in this respect, even taken over
an extended period of several decades (Simkus and Andorka 1982; Robert 1991a; Heyos and
Bialeski 1990).
Several explanations have been suggested for the apparent failure of egalitarian socialist
ideology or its reversal into a contradiction of its basic tenets.
One explanation of why equality policies in conununist countries did not fully live up to
expectations might lie in the obstacles governments face when trying to change societies. It
is probably an illusion to believe that the life chances of children from various background
can easily be regulated by centrally governed policies. Even in situations calling for severe
measures" peqple will always try to find a way to provide their children with a good
education. And people in higher positions have more resources and probably more ambition
to do so. Therefore, people in higher positions are assumed to be more successful in using or
curcumventing official regulations in order to improve their own life chances and those of
their children.
;. .\
Another explanation is that the policy measures on education taken by communist regimes
were not always as rigorous as suggested. According to published sources (e.g. Simkus and
Andorka (1982) on Hungary; Gerber and Hout (1994) on Russia) and several spokesmen, the
educational policies were upheld particularly in the 1950s, the period of orthodox
communism, but became much weaker in later decades. In Hungary, for ex~mple, dedication
to these policy aims waned again from the early 1960s on, with the "backdoor" liberalization
of the Hungarian economy. In Russia, such policies have never been explicit, not even at their
peak in the Khrushcev era around 1960 (Gerber and Hout 1994). However, in other countries,
especially Czecho·Slovakia, they were upheld much longer and lasted well into the 19805.
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In the remainder of this paper, we assess the trends in intergenerational educational
reproduction in Eastern Europe during the communist era. On those grounds, we can
determine the relative importance ofpolitical and cultural resources for educational attainment.
In order to understand the mechanisms of educational reproduction, we have analyzed data
from large-scale surveys that have been held in five Eastern European countries. Our research
design uses cohorts as baseline units of historical comparison.
The data analyzed here consist of rather large-scale samples (N= about 5,000 in each country)
of the general population of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, and Poland in
1993. The data were collected as part of the project "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe".
This ongoing project is directed by Ivan Szelenyi and Donald 1. Treiman (Treiman and
Some recent research has explicitly tested the hypothesis about the relatively large and
growing part played by cultural resources in the stratification process under state socialist
conditions; Several authors have confirmed the conclusion, reached in earlier research (see
above), that socialist societies remain highly stratified in cultural respects.. However, the
hypothesis that this applies to a larger extent than before has not found uneqUivocal support.
For instance; in research on educational attainment in Hungary, Peschar (1990) and
Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Robert (1990) find stronger effects in older cohorts than in
younger ones; However, reviewing more recent Hungarian data, Robert (1991b) finds
increasing effects of cultural background on educational achievement.
\
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
If this is indeed true, then a surprising parallel arises with the analysis made by the French
sociologist Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1994 [1970]). He analyzed cultural strategies
of social reproduction in bureaucratized; market-regulated societies. Not on the banks of the
River Seine but on the banks of the Duna, Vltava, and Wisla would "cultural capital" find its
best yield. According to Bourdieu's cultural reproduction theory, two basic resources
determine one's position in the stratification process. On the one hand there is "economic
capital", which is more than (a) monetary resources (income, wealth). It also presumes (b)
economic and commercial skills, (c) a general orientation towards and taste for conspicuously
displayed wealth, and (d) a corresponding social network. Bourdieu contrasts this with
"cultural capital," which consists not only of (a) formal credentials and qualifications
(education) and (b) knowledge and expertise, but also of (c) a general orientation towards and
taste for intellectual complexity, and (d) a corresponding social network. Whereas classical
stratification theories assume that material and cultural resources go together, cultural
reproduction theory points to their differential consequences and their different value in
varying contexts. Cultural resources are more difficult to appropriate than material resources,
since they can only be generated in a long process of socialization, in the parental family and
in the educational system. As a consequence, cultural inequalities are intrinsically more
enduring and resistant to outside intervention than economic inequalities (Kelley and Klein
1981). Although the perverse effects of some of these exogenous processes -- such as
educational expansion, the greater increased influence of parents in schools, as well as the
increased credentialism in bureaucratized societies -- may have caused the importance of
material resources to decline, cultural inequalities are on the rise.
Djilas (1957) still identified the members of the new class with a proletarian vanguard that
entrenched its position inside the state bureaucracy; Two decaded later, Gouldner (1979) and
Konrad and Szelenyi (1979) argued that the leading groups in state socialist societies are not
proletarian at all, but more of an intellectual breed, (However, see Konrad and Szelenyi
(1991) for critical remarks.) The latter authors have-come to characterize communist rule as
the "fmal victory of intellectuals over workers (and capitalists)." The core role of education
in distribution and reproduction processes of whatever kind in state socialist societies suggests
they may be right. According to this argument, Plato's admonition that "the [ideal] society ...
can never grow into reality' ...-till philosophers become kings in'this world, or till those we
now call kings and rulers really, and truly become philosophers, and political power and
philosophy come into the same hands ..." (Plato 1987 [ca. 400 B.C.]: p. 263) has become
more topical than Popper (1963}would have ever imagined in his criticism of totalitarianism.
Findings about the social composition of communist party members (Szelenyi 1987) show that
higher educated are strongly overrepresented in the political elite.
Th~'. idea '~ha~ ~ultural differe~ces hav~ re~la~~i:I. the ea~lier forms of'social inequality has
existed for a long time in Eastern European stratification research. Early evidence in favor of
this hypothesis was provided by 'Wesolowski and; Slomczynski (1968) for Poland and
Machonin (1969, 1970) for Czecho-Slovakia. These authors argued that cultural differences
under socialism are particularly large and constitute the pivotal element of distribution in their
societies.' This, ~ hypothesis has been advanced repeatedly by later Eastern European
stratification researchers (e.g. Kolosi and Wnuk-Lipinski 1983; Robert 1984, 1989). Now, one
may argue that this vivid interest in cultural inequality was simply a substitute for research
on political and economic inequality, which was obstructed by prevailing poli.ti~al
circumstances. Yet it may be true that under circumstances that prevent people fromacqulflng
material resources, individuals will tend to concentrate their socially distinctive and socially
reproductive behavior on the accumulation of cultural resources. Those who can successfully
accomplish this will be the best off in the distribution of status and privilege.
These theories of stratification processes found their best-known exponent in Djilas (1957).
His "New Class'! thesis postulates that under socialism; political resources have replaced other
determinants of social stratification. The ruling political class constitutes a status group with
its own cultural devices to establish social closure in much the same way as envisaged by
Weber (1972 [1921]) in his notion of social stratification. Accoring to Weber, the political
elite ensures its own reproduction by monopolizing access to positions of power; privilege,
and status. This is accomplished by direct discrimination ofothers and by exercising control
over indirect channels of social mobility. If this were the case in Eastern Europe, one would
expect membership of the political elite to be of major importance in gaining access to
(higher) ,education. Indeed, we know that education and diplomas comprised the major
selection mechanism in the stratification process under socialism.
A third ,reason why the discriminatory policies hardly had any noticeable effect in the
communist countries might be that the measures had ;unintended effects. They may have
created new forms of social inequality or inadvertently enlarged the differences between social
groups, In this light, various "New Class" theories have been proposed by'several students of
state socialist societies. These theories postulate that the traditional opposing classes (owners
vs. non-owners) have been replaced by new contrasts in socialist societies.
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Szelenyi 1993a; 1993b), It is conducted in collaboration with researchers from the countries
surveyed, the United States, and the Netherlands. The surveys are funded by the (American)
National Science Foundation and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO
(Treiman and Szelenyi 1993a), as well as by contributions from the countries under study.
The survey instrument goes beyond the usual stratification and mobility survey (e.g. Peschar
1993) in several ways. First, explicit measures of material, cultural, and political resources are
used. Furthermore, the data have been collected after the transition in 1989; that is, the
surveys have been held under political' circumstances that are more liberal than before.
Therefore, the data can be assumed to provide a more accurate picture of peoples' educational
careers and their social background. In addition, the specific contribution of the present
analysis is that, unlike earlier efforts, we that we have large-scale and highly comparable data
at our disposal and thereby get a general and comparative perspective on educational
opportunities. Moreover, while there is much high-quality data on educational opportunities
in Hungary and, to a somewhatlesser extent in Czecho-Slovakia, the datae from Bulgaria and
Russia leave much to be desired. The analysis presented below should therefore be seen as
a first attempt to draw these countries into the pool ofcountries available of the comparative
analysis of social stratification and social mobility.
The surveys of these countries differ somewhat in terms of the age restrictions placed on the
selected respondents,' To make the data as comparable as possible across the countries, the
respondents we selected in all countries had to be between 21 and 69 years of age at the time
they were interviewed. Thus, the youngest and eldest respondents were excluded. Since the
data were collected in 1993, these age restrictions provide us with information onthe process
of educational attainment for the several cohorts. These range from those who attended school
around 1940 (our oldest respondents) to those who attended school around 1985 (our youngest
respondents).
To examine trends in intergenerationaLeducational reproduction in the five countries under
investigation, we have divided the data into five-year wide cohorts. These cohorts constitute
the baseline units of our historical comparison. Their midpoint values correspond to the year
when the members of the cohort were on average 14 years of age (That is, we coded cohort
as: cohort = year of birth + 14. We chose this value because this is the age at which people
make crucial decisions on' educational careers; Moreover, this value gives the best
approximation of the historical contexts (such as war and revolution) that are associated with
the educational careers. It is important to realize that by necessity, the analysis of educational
attainment using cohort data refers to events that happened a long time ago for most of the
respondents. The lIaveragell respondent made hislher major decision around 1960, more than
30 years before the date of survey; the oldest respondents made these decisions around 1940
and the youngest around 1985. Consequentially, the so·called "replicated cohort designll
applied in'this paper offers a unique opportunity to examine long-term trends in educational
reproduction.
4. DEVELOPMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND PARENTS' POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL RESOURCES
This paper considers the process of educational attainment over the past decades. In particular,
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it focuses on how parents' education, cultural reSources, and political resources affect their
children's level of education. The aim is to shed light on the developments in these effects
over time. However, before we start narrowing our focus to these issues; we take another look
at the big picture. We first review some developments in the level of educational attainment
in the five Eastern European countries. We then trace some trends in parents' political and
cultural resources.
Educational attainment is analyzed for three persons: respondent, father, and mother. As the
comparative measure of educational attainment, we use the number of years it took to achieve
a given educational level. For the respondents, this was constructed from a complete roster
of educational attainment. For the parents, the highest level attained was recoded into the
approximate number of years of education, using expert judgment and conversions suggested
by the results for the respondents.
The data were sampled in the 21-69 age range; We use the full age range for our analysis of
educational attainment. In studies of educational attainment elsewhere, it is common to
increase the lower age boundary. This usage is based on the argument that people in their
early twenties are likely to get additional schooling, which endangers the validity of cohort
comparisons for historical analysis. We prefer to remediate this problem in the design by
adding (an arbitrary) two years to the score of those who are still in school. We doubt that
this choice makes much difference to the final results as the large majority of that population
never gets any education in their twenties. Even among the group of 21~24 years old, only
a slight majority is receiving education. It is important to look at the educational attainment
of the youngest in the datafile, as they are our only window on events since 1989. Of course,
this would only apply to the small proportion of the cohort that entered tertiary education in
the period of transition.
Figure 1 shows the educational distribution of men and women in the five countries in the
period 1940-1985. In the beginning of that period, there were significant differences between
countries in regard to the average number of years it took for people to finish their education.
The mean level of education was highest (about 10 years) in the Czech Republic - especially
for men. It was the lowest in Bulgaria (about 6.5 years). The data also show some similarities
to other industrial countries. For instance, around 1940, the average educational attainment
of women was significantly lower than that of men. Furthermore, the data show that the
average educational attainment has expanded. greatly since 1940 in the socialist countries, as
elsewher. But unlike other ,industrial countries, most of the rapid expansion took place in the
period 1940-1970 and was followed by a clear slowdown in the 1970s and 1980,. By 1975,
Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Slovak meri and women stayed in school almost twice as long
as in 1940. Educational expansion proceeded at a much slower pace for,Slovak men and for
Czech men and women, all of whom started at a considerably highef. level in 1940. In
particular, Czech and Slovak men have made remarkably little progress since 1940. The
developments in educational attainment differ between men and women in all countries.
Women have increased their educational attainment more than men. And by 1975, none of
the countries displayed much difference between men and women in terms of years of
schooling.
In order to assess the value of parents' political resources for their children's educational
career, we constructed an indicator of favorable political resources on the basis of whether the
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Figure 1. Educational expansion ;nfive Eastern European countries, birth cohorts in school
(age 14) in 1940-1985 .
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Figure 2. Parents' Party membership in five Eastern European countries, birth cohorts in
schooi (age 14) in 1940-1985
BUL CZR HUN
O'''j ~ jr j _ ?
o.06iL ~ k::::
.(0 50 60 70 80 40 50 60 70 80 40 50 60 70 80
:lst:








.(0 50 60 70 80 40 50 60 70 80
parents (mother and father) of the respondent were members ,of the Communist Party.
UnfortunatelYl there is no information in our dataset on ,when parents were members of the
party, nor on theiuelative positionJn, the party hierarchy, It iS,still reasonable to assume that
the questions, pick up some of the, political resources ,at the time that the respondent was
growing up and major decisions about hislher educational career were made. On average, 33
percent of the respondents in the Czech Republic, 25 percent in Russia, and between 18 and
21 percent in the "remaining ,three .countries indicated that ,one of their parents, had been a
member."Of. a communist political party. ,It is, -of course, ,hard to judge to-what extent
respondents gave reliable reports oftheir parents',party membership. However, the percentage
of respondents.-who report being a member-of a communist political party in 1993 is in
accordance with' official statistics. Therefore, we, are confident that infonuation given by
respondents about their parents',party membership is,a~soaccurate..
"The percentage of respondents in the various cohorts who reported that their parents have
been members of a communist political party is given in Figure 2.,Parents' party membership
was rather rare among the older cohorts, though it increased over time. The increase might
be simply a period effect: the parents of older respondents had less time to become a member
ofa communist party. In the Czech Republic, the percentage (36%) of parents' who had been
a member of a communist party peaked around 1965. ,In the other countries,:it increased over
the whole period and reached about 20 percent at its highest point.
It should be kept in mind that in all five countries, the group of party members included a
sizable proportion of highly educated persons. The correlation between party membership and
education in Russia and Bulgaria is the strongest (well over 0.30). In the other countries, this
correlation is weak but consistently significant (about 0.20). These findings emphasize the
advantage of examining the effects ofcultural and political resources simultaneously by means
of multivariate analysis.
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To measure parents' cultural resources; the survey included a battery of questions on the
cultural practices of the parents of respondents when the respondent was "around 14 years
old." The items included in this questionairre closely parallel those in instruments used to
measure cultural resources in other surveys. For example, the TARKI Hungarian stratification
surveys of 1982 and 1986 showed strong effects of these variables on the educational
attainment of respondents (Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Robert 1990). There are eight separate
questions, two of which pertain to cultural behavior outside home (museums, perfonnances),
while the remaining six refer to behavior at home, mostly reading habits. Of course, one may
speculate on the effects of the separate components of this set of indicators. (Does reading
matter more than other fonus of cultural participation?) Notwithstanding, the present paper
treats these indicators as an expression of one underlying dimension: command over "cultural
resources." This stance is further justified by the high intercorrelation between the eight items
and the corresponding high level of Cronbach's reliability coefficient in Appendix A. The
index on cultural resources was created by averaging the indicators standardized over the total
sample. In order to make effects comparable cross-nationally, the resulting index was then
standardized again within countries. , .
The means and standard deviations of the cultural resources index f~r all the cohorts in all
five countries show only moderate historical variations, which' parallels fmdings in other
countries. In case of strong historical variations, it becomes an issue whether the variable
should be conceptualized as a positional good that needs to be standardized within cohorts.
Given the low over-time variation, this is not of much importance here~ Nevertheless, we have
still taken the trouble to do this: the index of cultural resources is standardized within
countries, allowing an interpretation of cultural resources as a relative (positional) good, for
which the scores need to be interpreted relative to cohort means.
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5. MODELS distinguished cohorts.
Figure 3. Uncontrolled effects ofparental education on respondent's education in five Eastern
European countries, 'birth cohorts in school (age 14) in 1940~1985
As stated above, the aim of this paper is twofold. Let us now dwell on the first aim, which
is to assess the historical variations in patterns of educational attainment. To investigate the
effect of parents' education on the educational attainment of their children and the
developments in that effect, we analyze our data by applying a regression model with
multiplicative interaction terms. The equation for Model I , which is used in analyzing data
for men and women in the five countries separately, can be written as follows:
where the variables "Child's education" and "Parents' education" (Le. the average education
of father and mother) refer to the number of years it took to complete a given educational
level for children and their parents, and the variable "cohort" refers to the' five-year wide
cohorts we designate as units for historical comparison. The variable "cohort," as pointed out
above, originally ranged from 1940 to 1985. This range covers the period during which the
oldest and the youngest respondents in our data set were 14 years of age and important
decisions on their educational careers were made. We centered this variable around the "cohort
of 1960" by subtracting 1960 from its original value. Accordingly, the intercept coefficient
(P2) for the effect of parents', education pertains to that effect around 1960.
Child's education = PIi"'COHORT j +
P2"':Parents' education + PJ"'COHORTj"'Parents' educaticn (1)
Second, the variable "cohort" is included in the model as an interaction tenn with the variable
"Parents' education." Then it represents the developments in the effect of parents' resources
on their children's educational attairnnent. It isthese developments that are under investigation
here. To examine the nature of these developments, we evaluate three nested versions of this
model. In the discrete cohort model (A), it is assumed that effect of parents' education differ
between cohorts and are allowed to do so in free variation (cohort j = cohort;). We estimate
a different effect for each of the distinguished i cohorts. Since we distinguished II five-year-
wide cohorts, this model requires ten degrees of freedom (number of cohorts - I) and is our
least parsimonious model. In the linear change model (B), it is assumed that the differences
between cohorts can be modeled as a linear trend (cohort j = cohort j), which requires a single
degree of freedom. Comparison between the discrete cohort model (A) and the linear change
model (B) leads to a gross test of whether there are non-linearities in the historical patterns
of effects. Since this is a nine degrees of freedom test, it may still hide significant spikes in
the data that might be uncovered by more parsimonious specifications of the non-linearities.
We guard against these possibilities by conducting a visual inspection of the parameters of
models (A) and (B). Finally, we test whether the linear changes modeled in (B) are
statistically significant, or whether the even simpler model (C) of no historical changes
(cohort j = 0) still fits the data.
Let us now turn to the second aim of this paper and examine the extent to which the effect
of parents' education on their children's education is mediated by the effects of the cultural
and political resources of the parents. Concomitantly, we examine the extent to which these
later effects have changed over the last decades. The model we use to study the effects and
their changes Model II is similar to Model I. But the second model also included the variables
for "Parents' party membership," "Parents' cultural participation" and the interaction between
these variables and tlcohort" also are included:
132"'Parents' education + PJ*COHORT1"'Parents' education +
Child's education ~ ~1i"'COHORTj +
",,}£'U'., " '. ~,~,~CZR.... ""1~Hu,N',",n~RUS. ""b"O0
" 0 0 0"
"0' "'0 '°0 i ° 0 0
0,'" " " " '0 eo o,,,~ ". " " "',0 ~""" " " " ,,' 0,'" " " " " eo 0,,,,,, " eo " :0
p,,"'Parents'partymembership + Ps"'COHORTj"'Parents' partymembership +
P6*Parents' cult. participation + P1"'COHORT1"'Parenls' cult. participation (2)
() men
o women
The'variable licohortt is included twice in Model LFirst, this variable is included as ,the
intercept' and takes into account the developments in the avetage level of educational
attairnnent. 'As mentioned earlier, educational expansion for both men and women in the five
countries Was more progressive in the beginning of the period under investigation and weak
(or even absent) near the end ofit. Therefore, we included the variable "cohort;" in a discrete
manner ~ Le., specifying dummy variables for the various cohorts .. allowing for these non-
linear trends. As a result, the Pli coefficient represents the mean level of education in the
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where the variable "Parents' party membership" is coded 1 for c~ildre~\who indicated their
parents had been a member of a communist party, zero if they did not; and the variable
"Parents' cultural participation" is a score on an index that we standardized within each cohort
within each country: in each cohort the mean is rescaled to zero, t,he stardard deviation to 1.
The centering around the mean of the scores within a cohort avoids collinearity between the
variables "cultural participation" and '''cohortu• In addition, by standardizing the index of
cultural participation, the historic changes in the distribution of parents' cultural participation
in a society do not influence the results of our analysis, In Model II, again we centered the
variable "cohort" around cohort 1960, As a result, the (intercept) coefficients P4 and P6 refer
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to the effects of parents' party membership and cultural participation in the period around
1960, and the trend parameters (Ps and P7) refer to absolute changes in these effects compared
to these effects in that period,
Table 1. pelected Coefficients from Regression Models for (Trends in) Effects of Social
Background in Educational Attainment
Figure 4. Controlled effects of (1) parents ~ education (controlled for effictsof parents'
,I :', political and cultural resources) and (2) parental political resources (controlledfor
effects ofparents' education and cultural resources) on respondent's education in
five Eastern European countries, birth cohorts in school (age 14) in 1940-1985
(I) political, resour~es
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A. Educational Reproduction ca. 1960
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men .400 .489 .537 .275 .560
women .467 .595 .483 .326 .600
B. Trends in Educational Reproduction (change/5 years)
men -.018 -.009n8 -.033 .005n, -.046
women -.018 -.029 -.009n, .002n8 -.047
All effects are measured in years of schooling per iJnit. Units are: Parents' Education: mean years of
education father+mother. Trends: change per 5 years. ns: coefficient less than twice its standard error.
6. RESULTS
Trends in educational reproduction
BUl. ", 1 •
,.••~.,', ''',''''"',,....~CZ~,'''i": , ....~HU~'.,' '.'" RU' 'c. '. ,',.... seo ,',.
0, ".: ,"I"·"·' 0 ' b?'",b". 0 j., 0" 'i 0 ' .. : 0,
, 00 0 .'; , '0, " 0 00 0
O.19l 0.19~.0.19~ . 0194 0 0019l 0/
~50Wro~ ~50~10~ ~50W70~' ~50~70~" ~50W70~
We first address a' descriptive'. issue:' Has socialism·1changed ,the, pattern of' educational
reproduction at all? Then we discuss whether the observed patterns of change in access to
(higher) education are linear or non-linear. To examine which pattern ofchange describes our
data best, we employ Model I and compare three versions of it. One of these represents non-
linear changes (using discrete cohorts) in the effects of parents' education on their children's
edu~ation (Model A). Another one assumes linear changes over cohorts (Model B). The third.
verSIOn assumes no ,change (Model C). The results of comparing. these models are rather
consi~te~t: I? al~ ten cases ~. five countries, taking men and womert separately - an adequate
descnptton IS given by a Imearsummary of the developments in the effects of parents'
education on the level of education attained by their children. The relevant coefficients of
Model B for the five countries investigated are presented in Table l,1lI ,
Let us start by examining the magnitude of the effects of parents' education on that of their
children. Recall that we centered the variable "cohort" around the cohort" 196011 • Accordingly,
the effects of parents' education in the cohort "1960" are represented by the estimated
coefficients (P2) presented in Part A of Table 1. Both the dependent and independent variables
(respondent's education and the mean of father's and mother's education) in Model I are
operationalized .in the same way in the five countries, and these show similar standard
deviations. Therefore! the estimated effectparameters can be compared among the countries.(ll
The coefficients vary between 0.50 and 0.60 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia.
Internationally compared, these values are rather high (see Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1993).
The values in Bulgaria (0.40 for men and 0.47 for women) are somewhat lower; but only
those for Russia (0.28 for men and 0.33 for women) are somewhat low from an international
perspective. On average, these results square with ·conclusions drawn in earlier studies.
Namely, they suggest that communist regimes have not succeeded in truncating the
intergenerational transmission of status through education. In this respect, the low values of
the coefficients for the, effects of parents' education on their children's education in Russia
are somewhat surprising. However, since we have no other dataset for Russia at our disposal,
we can not draw definite conclusions on the (low) level of educational reproduction in Russia
over the past decadesYI
The next question to be addressed is: How much have the effects of p~rents' education on the
educational level of their children changed during the period r'940-1~85. Part B of Table 1
shows the relevant (linear) trend coefficients; which reveal that the effects of parental
education have decreased in four countries for both men and 1¥0men. Again, Russia fonus an
exception: the trend coefficient is virtually zero. This value indicates that hardly any long-term
change in the level of educational reproduction has occurred and that Jhis effect remained at
the low level discussed above during the whole period from 1940 until 1985. In two other
cases (that of Czech men and Hungarian women), the trend coefficients also are statistically
insignificant. However, in these cases, the trendparameters have a negative value. Not only
the sign but also the value df the estimated trendcoefficients can be interpreted in a
<> men
o women(2) cultural resources
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Table 2. Selected Coefficients from Regression Models for (Trends in) Effects of Social
Background in Educational Attainment
11. Trends in Educational Reproduction (change/5 years) after controlling Parents' Culture and
Party Membership
A" Educational Reproduction ca. 1960 after controlling Parents' Culture and Party
MemberShip
straightforward way, These represent a decline in the effects of parents' education per decade
compared to the effects on members of the middle cohort, as presented in Part A of Table 1.
Among other things, this implies that for Hungarian men and for Slovakian men and women
in the last cohort (who entered the educational system around 1985), parental- influence on
their educational level was about one~third of the influence observed in the middle cohort
(who entered around 1960) and was almost as low as the Russian level. Considering the low
intercept coefficient in Russia, this low Russian level is almost reached in Bulgaria even
though Bulgaria has a relatively moderate negative trend coefficient. Concluding, our analysis
reveals that on average the advantages ofmgher levels of education have gradually diminished
over the communist period. By and large, the effects of parents' education On their children's
education declined by about half over the period 1940-1985; In view of the results of earlier













Effects 0/political and cultural resources
Finally,we ask:: To what extent were cultural resources (as measured by, parents' cultural
practices when the respondent'was growing up) and political resources (as measured by
parents having been a member of the socialist or communist party) important.toeducational
careers under communism? The underlying issue here is the debate on intellectuals as the
"New (leading) Class" under socialism (Konrad and Szelenyi 1979). To answer this question
we analyze our data employing Model II , Besides parents" education; this model includes their
political and cultural resources as explanatory variables.
- I '! ',." _ ': 'j ') !,~, i; l ' : ", "
Also for this model,' we' compared three versions. For each of the effect~, we assumed
respectively (A) non-linear changes across cohorts, (B) linear changes, or (C) no changes. The
choice between the different versions of the models is not unequivocal for the various cases.
In five'ofthe ten cases (five countries, men and women taken separately), the non-linear trend
model 'describes our data best;' in the other five, the linear trend model is most suitable.
However; the amount of variance explained by both models is very similar, and the more
parsimonious linear version yields an adequate fit in all cases, 'Therefore, Table 2 presents the
central coefficients of the linear version of Model II. I
Parts A,C" and E'of this table 'show the (intercept)coefficients (Pl' 04' and P6)' representing
the effects of parents' education;' parents"political resources, and their cultural resources,
respectively;' around 1960. Parts B,' D,' and P. show the (trend) coefficients (P3' P5; and P7)
representing the (absolute) changes per five years in the mentioned effects. Both the intercept
and the trendcoefficients can be compared across countries and between men and women. The
(intercept) coefficient for the effect of party membership represents the difference in the
number of years of education attained between children of party members and children of
parents who had not belonged toa communist party. The (intercept) coefficient for cultural
resources represents the difference in years ofeducation between children whose parents differ
one standard deviation on the Z-score of the variable cultural' participation. Since we also
centered the variable lI cohort" in ModelU around the'1960-cohort, the (intercept) coefficients
for the effects of parents' education, cultural resourcesJ :and political resources refer to the'
effects of these factors in that period. .
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men -.004n' .007n' -.013n' .017n, -.006ns
women -.009n' -.007n' -.OOln' .012n, -.017n'
C. Effect of Parent,' Party Membership ca. 1960
men .779 .396 .305n, .713 .374
womeri .612 .197 .062ns .707 .474
D. Trends in Effect of Parent's Party Membership (change/5 year)
men -.156 -.033n' -.I03n' -.122 -.012n'
women -.026n' -.05In' .012n' -.Olln' -.137
E. Effect of Parents' Cultural Resources ca. 1960
men ,932 .722 1.227 .596 .846
women .945 .777 1.195 .685 .933
E Trends in Effect of Parents' Cultural Resources (change/5 years)
men -.136 -.056 -.246 -.081 -.141
women -.106n' -.058 -.080 -,117 -.077
All effects are measured in years of schooling per unit. Units are: Parents' Education: mean years of
education father+mother, Parents' Party Membership~ (0) never (I) even member communist party
(father or mother). Parents's Cultural Resources: standardized index of 8 items (mean=O, stdev=l).
Trends: change per 5 years. ns: coefficient less than twice its standard tITor. -
\
An interesting outcome of our analysis is the extent to which the effect of parents' education
on their children's educational attainment is interpreted by the added variables, namely
parents' party membership and ,cultural participation. The co~trolled, effect of parents'
education (Part A in Table 2) varies between 0.27 and 0,39 in the four satellite states of the
Soviet Union, and is 0.16 (for men) and 0,20 (for women) in Russia.' A comparison of these
controlled effects with the uncontrolled effect of parents' education (given in Part A of Table
1) demonstrates that on average, one-third to a half of the educational reproduction is
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mediated yiaparty membership and cultural participation. Cultural partidpationhere plays the
major r~le, while' the effect of parents' party membership is modest.
The estlmatedcoefficients fof the effects of parents' party membership (Part C in Table 2)
are all positJve' but differ substantially in size. The effect of parents' party membership, for
example, is statistically insignificant in Hungary, whereas in Bulgaria and Russia these effects
are considerable (about 0.7 years). It is probably no coincidence that these latter countries
show the weakest effects of parents' education on their children's education. However, there
is evidence that the effect was relatively strong in the early communist period but had
declined to insignificance,for·th~ YOWlger cohorts.. ;, \. '
The estimated effects of parents' cultural participation on t~eir children's educl;ltion (Part E
in Tabk I) are not :directly comparable to the effects of the other variables. Nevertheless,
since the standardized variable' has a reach of four times its standard deviation, we can
conclude that this factor has a much stronger impact than parents' party membership. Without
exception, ,all pertinent coefficients for parents' cultural, participation are, positive, and
statistically significant. Moreover, they hardly differ between men and women. The
coefficients are highest in Hungary, the country where Bourdieu'scultural reproductiontheory
has been corroborated repeatedly. The smallest effect of cultural participation is. found in
Russia, but even there the effect is substantial. This leads us to conclude that in all five
countries, the cultural resources ofparents are highly beneficial to their children's educational
attairunent. This conclusion corresponds to the hypothesis that socialist intellectuals form a
"New Class". Those belonging to this group are able to use the established socialist
distribution of power to their own advantage.
However, the (interaction) coefficients that pertain to the trends in the effects of parents' .
cultural resources on their children's education (Part F in Table 1) reveal that the effects of
cultural participation have declined substantially over the past decades. Thus, if the intellectual
elite took advantage of the socialist circumstances, they profited more from the orthodox than
the liberal brand of socialism, The pertinent trendcoefficients have high, statistically
significant, negative values and thus imply a substantial decline in ~e effects of par~nts'
education in most countries. For example, the effect ofparents' educatIOn on the educational
attainment of Hungarian men was large in the older cohorts (around 1940) but is almost
absent in the most recent cohorts (around 1985): This result replicates earlier findings for the
Hungarian case (Ganzeboom et,at. .1990). And this outcome implies that the decline in the
effects of cultural participation, together with the decline)n the effects;.of parents' party
membership, are largely responsible for the decline in the uncontrolled effects. of parents'
education on that oftheir children'in the communist countries, as observed earlier.
-,"
Before making some concluding remarks, let us summarize the results of our analyses for the
various countries gr~phically. In Figure 3, ,we pre,sent tref?ds in the uncontrolled effects of
parents' edu~at~on, o,n that ofJheir chil~ren: In Figure 4, we present trends in,the ;~~ntrolled
effects ~f p,arents' education, aS,well as the (controlle,d) effects· ~f p~rents pohtIcal and
cultural'resou~cesi\"In these tigures, We plotted both the 'estimated values obtained from a
discrete (non::-linear) 'trend ve'rsion of the models,and values from a linear tr~nd version. This
gives an impr~ssfqn to .w~at extent and ,in which cohorts the linear andnon-linearversion~ led
to.different results,' In general, however, differences.between the outcomes of the two verSIons
appear not torbe linked to certain periods. Thus, a'linear approach to the data provides an
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adequate (and parsimonious) description of the development.
In three countries, however, the effect of parents' party membership is exceptionally high in
the begiIU1ing of the period under investigation. This is curious, since the children of these
cohorts were already in school when the communist regimes came to power. Thus, a relatively
low effect of parents' party membership is to be expected. A possible explanation of this
inconsistent finding might be that children of revolutionary commWlists benefited from their
parents eliteposition later on in their (educational) career. Nevertheless, before advancing this.
interpretation, we should stresS that for the oldest cohorts, the effects of party membership
presented here are based upon analysis of a limited number of respondents.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the analyses discussed above lead us to three main conclusions.
Our first conclusion is that in aU five Eastern European countries under investigation, the
parents' education has a substantial effect on their children's education. Although no explicit
comparisons with other countries have been made, we found that the strength of the effects
of parents' education in four out of the five countries is even stronger than usually found in
Western countries with a market economy. Only in Russia did we find a level of
intergenerational educational reproduction that is rather weak, from an international
perspective.
Our second main conclUSion is that parents' party membership (to a small extent) and their
cultural participation (to a considerable extent) influence the level of education their children
attained. These factors explain on average about one-third to a half of the effect of parents'
education on educational attainment. These findings thus support the "New Class" theories,
which assume that intellectuals tend to benefit most under a state socialist regime.
The slow but consistent decline, in the detenninants of educational attainment in all countries
over the last decades fonns a third important conclusion of this study. In four countries, the
parents' social background lost its impact on their children's educational career; while in
Russia this impact was already limited at the begirming of the period under investigation. The
gradual expansion towards opeIU1ess occurred with respect both to the effects of parents'
education and the effects of parents' political and cultural resources. Concluding, there seems
to be an unmistakable trend toward a situation where ascriptive characteristics have only a
limited impact on educational attainment, , .',
. . . .,
The conclusions drawn from this study are in accordance with the geperaI'pattern of trends
in educational attairunent found in other countries. Due to a procel'S of educational expansion
in recent decades, parents have less influence on their children's' educational career than in
earlier decades. This is probably due to two supplementary mechaJ,1isms\ First, because of
educational expanSion, almost all children spend a number of years in the educational system
and make it to the flsecond level". Second, since choices about children's (further) educational
career have to be made when they are older (De Graaf and Ganzeboom 1993), children's
educational chances have become less dependent on their parental background. The extent to
which the political climate in the Eastern European countries has fostered this process of
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educational expansion and its consequences for educational reproduction remains a topic for
further research.
Another t~~ic f~r further research'.is the rema~kably strong decline in the effects of parents'
cultural resources in the five Eastern European countries. In The Netherlands, for example,
recent analyses showed hardly any decline in cultural, and educational reproduction, over the
past decades (Van Eijk and De Graaf 1994). Differences between Western market economies
and state socialist countries might be due to the relatively strong educational expansion in
Eastern Europe. However, for a better understanding of the trends in educational success and
educational reproduction, both types of countries have to be compare;d explicitly. ,
NOTES
I. Earlier versions ofthis paper were presented at the: Workshop on Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after
1989, December 11-13 1994, Budapest; Meetings of the ISA Research Committee on Social Stratification at the ISA
World Congress, Bielefeld, July 18-23 1994; Bi-annual Meetings of the Netherlands Sociological Association,
Amsterdam, April 1994; and the Meeting orthe ISA Research Committee on Social Stratification, Canberra, January
1994. '
2. An appendix ,containing all, results ofthe analyses carried out can be obtained upon reques,t from the authors;
3. The standard deviations of the variables concerned, however, are not entirely identical; that Is, they range from
0.51 in Bulgaria to 0.32 in Russia.
4. The data set collected by Gerber and Haul (1994) also contains information on educational reproduction in the
former Soyiet Union, but only It regional part of. that country is covered. Analysis of their data using the same
models resu1t~ In ~omewhat higher rep'roduction coeffic!ents than ,Our analyses (personal communication Ted
Gerber). , '
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Appendix A: Measures of Parental Cultural Consumption in Respondent's Childhood
range means
BUL CZR HUN RUS SLO
MUSEUM 0-6 .49 .75 .56 .62 .58
PERF 0-6 1.03 .62 .63 .63
MUSIC 0-6 .40 I.l2 .73 .60 .94
READING 0-6 1.35 3.29 1.68 2.49 2.57
LIBRARY 0-6 .71 1.73 .85 1.51 I.l5
DICTION 1-2 1.32 1.38 1.47 1.24 1.38
ATLAS 1-2 1.39 1.85 1.65 1.50 1.80
BOOKS 1-8 3.58' 4.59 3.76 3.65 3.60
reliability (alpha) .807 .866 .849 .832
* Problem in variable.
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